Adversary emulation offers a concrete way to measure a network's resilience against an advanced attacker. Unfortunately, adversary emulation is typically a manual process, making it costly and hard to employ. Progress in automated adversary emulation techniques has only been lightly validated, and technique dependence on network properties has not been quantified. In this paper, we describe a simulation testbed designed to model attackers operating within a Windows enterprise network. Running a series of tests, we found that strategies that use automated planning tend to outperform those that do not. Additionally, we found that detection frequency was the most significant factor in attacker performance, with network activity a close second; host connectivity, by contrast, was not particularly significant. We obtained similar results when the attacker mitigated risk, however in these scenarios we found that detection was less significant and vulnerability incidence more. These results can be used to inform future cyber simulation efforts.
limited to a few isolated simulation scenarios. More work is needed to understand how adversary emulation techniques compare to each other and vary in performance based on network parameters.
Related Work
Hoffmann (2015) gives an overview of automated attacker strategies, taxonomizing them based on the action model used (i.e., whether actions are things themselves or graph edges) and uncertainty for the attacker. On one end of the spectrum are models built around attack graphs; Ammann et al. (2002) detail a technique to chain vulnerabilities together in a graph to determine how an attacker could achieve a specific goal when attacking a network. Obes et al. (2010) take this a step further, using automated planning strategies to reason over an attack graph structure. On the other end of the spectrum is work such as Sarraute et al. (2012) , which uses a partially observable Markov decision process as the model; here, the attacker has uncertainty regarding both its state in the environment and the success of its actions. Our own work in Applebaum et al. (2016) featured a similarly inspired approach, using a small simulation to validate the proposed method.
Most of the research on automated red teaming focuses on the automated red teaming methodology and less on the simulation or test environment that was used to validate it. By contrast, research on simulation environments tends to focus on the environment and not on modeling the attacker. Kavak et al. (2016) perform a survey of security simulation scenarios -including a breakdown of popular simulation testbeds -but state that most simulated attackers follow a scripted set of actions and few implement more advanced decision-making techniques. Leblanc et al. (2011) conducted a similar survey, finding that many simulated attacker techniques to some extent lack depth, focusing on external attacks such as denial of service.
Within the simulation body of research, Kuhl et al. (2007) illustrates a simulation with a complex attacker module. In this work, the attacker can be in one of ten stages; using these stages, the attacker chooses its next action based on a graph-based approach, similar to a finite-state machine. While this provides it with increased sophistication, the attacker makes optimal decisions using full information about the simulated network. Moskal et al. (2014) also provide an interesting attacker model where they use preferences to dictate when an attacker will execute an action, running the attacker over predefined scenarios. The authors of this work also note the difficulty associated with defining complex attacker behavior.
Contribution In this work, we seek to bridge the gap between complex attackers and simulation model. We build on our prior work in Applebaum et al. (2016) by significantly enhancing the model and testing different variants of attacker strategies. Our new model features an active defender, a more complex network model, and enhanced capabilities. Additionally, we test a wider variety of attacker strategies, including a new one developed for this paper, in a variety of different configurations. Finally, we also run each battery of tests in two attacker models: one where the attacker is agnostic regarding the defender, and one where the attacker attempts to hide its activities from the defender. Our simulations elucidate results about the viability of attacker strategies, offensive-based management of risk, and network variance as it relates to the attacker.
SIMULATION MODEL
We define our simulation environment using the K (Eiter et al. 2000) action planning language and implement it using the DLV K (http://www.dlvsystem.com/k-planning-system/) engine for reasoning and bash scripts for coordination. Using K, we can easily define the necessary conditions and effects of actions, while DLV itself gives us access to a Datalog-like reasoning system. Our model encodes necessary details about typical Windows enterprise domains and simulates how an advanced adversary would operate within the network after gaining an initial foothold. In this section, we define the basics of the construction and execution of our model, leaving the description of attacker strategies and construction for Section 3. Dynamic The credentials for account A are currently stored in host X. activeConnection(X,Y ) Dynamic There is an active network connection between hosts X and Y .
Construction
Our simulation environment is composed of three main components: the objects in the environment, the properties between the objects, and the settings that control objects and properties.
Objects We setup a simulation as a composition of four main objects: hosts, domains, accounts, and vulnerabilities, where each of these objects corresponds to an object in a real Windows enterprise environment. Internally, hosts are labeled as either personal workstations or as shared workstations; while both are hosts, they have different construction parameters. These four objects provide the building blocks for our model.
Properties Table 1 lists the nine properties in our model. Of these nine, seven are static throughout the course of a game, while two are dynamic and subject to change based on agent behavior. We also maintain a series of rules that use these properties, such as the commutativity of connections, remote administrator login ability, and remote domain administrator login capability.
Settings Our simulation allows a controller to dictate how worlds are generated using the objects and properties listed above. Each of these settings can broadly be classified in one of three ways: fixed, which describe fixed network parameters (e.g., number of personal/shared workstations, number of domains); perobject maximum, which specify the maximum value for a given object property (e.g., maximum number of domains a host can be in, maximum number of admins a shared workstation can have); or probabilistic, which specify the likelihood a randomly selected pair will have a property (e.g., the probability a host will have a vulnerability, probability two hosts are connected). By default, personal workstations have exactly one local administrator and are members of exactly one domain; shared workstations typically have more. The parameters for connectivity and vulnerabilities are later controlled in our test environment in Section 4.
Execution
Each simulation is run as a game, with three disjoint participants: a gray agent, which simulates user activity, a defender, and an attacker. To begin a game, we construct a world following the description in Section 2.1 and give the attacker a low-privilege foothold somewhere on the network. Then, we use an iterative, turnbased technique, allowing the attacker to make a move, followed by the gray agent making a batch of moves, and finally by the defender; we leave more complex attacker/defender interactions to future work. We repeat this process a pre-set number of times (referred to as the number of turns in the game), measuring results at the end of the game. Note that the attacker has imperfect information regarding its state in the network; at any point in time, the attacker's view of the network will be limited to what the attacker can see. For example, at the beginning of a simulation, all the attacker knows is that it has compromised a single host, with no knowledge regarding other hosts or user accounts.
Gray Agent The gray agent simulates normal user activities within the network, operating with the following capabilities:
• Rebooting a host. This change will flush all active credentials within that host; if the attacker were to dump credentials immediately after a reboot, it would not receive any.
• Logging a user into a host. This will store a user's credentials in the memory of that host. Only accounts that are authorized to log in and are not currently logged in may log in to a given host.
• Opening a network connection between two hosts. This simulates two hosts talking to each other on the network. Only hosts are authorized to share network traffic can open connections to each other.
• Closing a network connection between two hosts. This terminates an active connection between two hosts. This can only be triggered if there is an active connection between two hosts.
The gray agent executes a batch of multiple actions during its turn, where each capability has a predefined probability, varied during testing, to execute during an action turn within a batch.
Detection and Defense This work builds on our prior work by adding in a robust defensive component. During each turn, the gray agent opens a set of new connections. Additionally, the attacker can create a new network connection if it executes a lateral movement action from one host to another host where a connection does not already exist. Based on a pre-configured probability, the defender will analyze each of these new connections; if the defender analyzes a new connection that was created by the attacker performing a lateral movement action, then the attacker's foothold on both hosts will be removed. If the attacker instead leverages an existing active connection between hosts, then the action is immune from detection. Note that the defender is only able to detect lateral movement and exploitation attempts as these are the only actions that can create new connections. The likelihood of detection is varied in our tests in Section 4.
MODELING A CYBER ATTACKER
Cyber attackers in our simulation are composed of three main components: knowledge, which defines what the attacker can know about a given environment; capabilities, which are the things the adversary can do during its turn; and strategy, which is how the adversary chooses a capability to execute.
Attacker Knowledge
The predicates used to represent the attacker's knowledge are shown in Table 2 . These predicates fall into two categories: those that represent the attacker's state of knowledge about the environment, and those that represent the attacker's state of compromise within the network. The predicates for knowledge about the environment correspond to the predicates for the world in Table 1 , while predicates denoting a state of compromise correspond to the capabilities listed below in Section 3.2 Table 2 : Predicates to describe the attacker's knowledge about the network (top) and predicates that describe the attacker's state of compromise within the network (bottom).
Name Description knowsCreds(A)
The attacker knows the credentials for account A.
The attacker knows that hosts X and Y are connected.
The attacker knows that account A is authorized to remotely log in to host X. knowsAdmin(A, X)
The attacker knows that account A has administrative access to host X. knowsActiveConnection(X,Y ) The attacker knows there is an active connection between hosts X and Y . ex f iltrated(X)
The attacker has successfully exfiltrated all important files from host X. escalated(X)
The attacker has an escalated foothold on host X. hasFoothold(X)
The attacker has a foothold on host X. hostEnumerated(X)
The attacker has performed all local discovery on host X. probedAccounts(X)
The attacker has probed host X to discover all of its local admins.
exploited(X, E)
The attacker has attempted to exploit host X using exploit E.
Attacker Capabilities
The attacker capabilities in our model mimic stages in the cyber attack lifecycle, with each capability crafted from a tactic in the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) framework (http://attack.mitre.org). The ATT&CK framework focuses on understanding what adversaries do after they breach a network, defining adversary tactical goals and techniques that can be used to achieve those goals. The ATT&CK model is grounded in publicly available threat reporting of real adversary behavior.
Our simulated attacker leverages techniques from six of the ten tactics in ATT&CK. Each capability in our model has a set of preconditions that must be true for execution and postconditions that will be true after execution. Most of these capabilities mirror our prior work in Applebaum et al. (2016) , except for runExploit(X, E) and knowsActiveConnection(X,Y ), which are both new to this work. Each capability below is listed alongside its tactic in ATT&CK. Note that the requirements typically assume the attacker is using already existing credentials on compromised hosts, acting as an authorized user.
lateral(X, A) Laterally move to host X using account A (Lateral Movement). To execute this capability, the attacker must already have a foothold on another host on the network (Y ), know that X and Y are connected, know the credentials to account A, have an escalated foothold on Y , know that A is authorized for remote login on X, and not already have a foothold on X. After successfully running this technique, the attacker will have a foothold on X.
dumpCreds(X) Dump the active credentials on host X (Credential Access). The attacker must have an escalated foothold on X to execute this capability. After running dumpCreds(X), the attacker will know the credentials of any users who have active credentials stored on the host.
probeAccounts(X) Find the admins on host X (Discovery). To run probeAccounts(X), the adversary must have a foothold on Y , Y must be connected to X and the adversary must not have a foothold on X or probed accounts on X. After executing this capability, the attacker will know all accounts that are admins, including both local and domain, on X. This capability assumes that the attacker is working with sufficient domain credentials on Y to run a command such as net.
enumerateHost(X) Extensively enumerate host X (Discovery, Collection). To run enumerateHost(X), the adversary must have an escalated foothold on X and not have previously enumerated the host. After running enumerateHost(X), the adversary will know all hosts that X is connected to and will know all active connections to and from X.
exfiltrate(X) Exfiltrate sensitive data from host X (Exfiltration). To exfiltrate from X, the adversary must have an escalated foothold on X, must have enumerated X, and must not have previously exfiltrated from X. Data will be exfiltrated from X after execution. Note that in our model exfiltration is performed once, signifying that the adversary successfully exfiltrated all relevant files. For our purposes, exfiltration does not create new network connections, though in practice it typically will.
runExploit(X, E) Run exploit E against host X (Lateral Movement). To execute this capability, the adversary must have a foothold on Y , must know that X and Y are connected, and must not have a foothold on X or have tried to exploit X using E in the past. After running runExploit(X, E), the adversary will have a foothold on X if and only if X is vulnerable to E. Note the attacker only learns whether a host is vulnerable to an exploit after they attempt to exploit it.
escalate(X) Escalate privileges on host X (Privilege Escalation). The only precondition for escalate(X) is that the adversary must have a low-privilege foothold on X. The only postcondition is that the adversary will have an escalated foothold on X. Note that lateral movement with lateral(X, A) can skip the escalation step on X if A is an administrator.
Cautious Actions While not explicitly encoded in our capabilities, our model allows for an attacker strategy to choose to execute actions cautiously; that is, without the risk of being detected. This applies specifically to the runExploit(X, E) and lateral(X, A) actions; both of these can be run without risk of detection if the attacker enumerates the launching host first and chooses a target with which the launcher already has an active connection. These variants require the host to be enumerated first.
Attacker Strategies
We created six example strategies, including two baselines, that show how an attacker can choose to execute a capability in a given scenario. Three of these operate using a planning paradigm, where they try to plan for actions to execute in the future, while the other three only look at the immediately possible actions. Four out of the six of our strategies were modified from our prior work in Applebaum et al. (2016) , while the last two were newly developed for this work. Each strategy can be customized to prefer cautious actions to mitigate the defender's detection capabilities; we refer to this as the cautious configuration, and the normal actions as the regular configuration.
Immediate Execution Strategies
Strategies that use immediate execution are those that only consider the current environment. These strategies do not attempt to plan for the future.
Random Selection As a baseline, we include an agent that chooses actions randomly; at any given state, this agent determines what capabilities it can execute, selecting one completely at random. The random agent does not feature a cautious configuration. This agent is intended as a worst-case baseline.
Greedy Selection The greedy algorithm only looks at currently possible capabilities, selecting the one to execute based on a pre-configured profile. This agent prioritizes exfiltration first, followed by enumeration, lateral movement, and then remotely probing accounts. If any of these actions are possible, it executes it, prioritizing the action based on its position in the list. If none are possible, it selects from the other possible actions at random. Previously, our greedy algorithm only prioritized exfiltration, choosing an action at random otherwise. The cautious configuration prefers cautious lateral movement to normal lateral movement.
Finite-State Machine The finite-state machine (FSM) algorithm operates by executing a sequence of actions in order, repeating the sequence when it reaches the end. If the action to be executed is not available in a given step, then the next action in the list is selected; by construction, there is always at least one action for the adversary to execute. The order of execution for the FSM is: escalate, dump credentials, enumerate, exfiltrate, probe accounts, and then lateral movement. During the lateral step, if no lateral movement actions are possible using credentials, the FSM attempts to exploit a vulnerability on a remote host. In the cautious configuration, the FSM tries to execute cautious lateral movement or exploitation if possible (if not, the FSM executes the normal version of the action, running risk of detection).
Planning-Based Strategies
Planning-based strategies chain actions together to achieve a goal for the future. For example, consider the case when the adversary is initially placed on the network. Here, the best plan for exfiltraiton would be to escalate, enumerate the host, and then exfiltrate.
In some scenarios, the best plan to execute is not clear due to the adversary's uncertainty in the environment. For example, suppose the attacker has a foothold on A, has enumerated and exfiltrated A, knows that A is connected to B and C, and has probed admins on B. A good plan in this case would be to exploit C, escalate on C, enumerate C, and then exfiltrate C. Alternatively, another plan might be to dump credentials on A, laterally move to B, enumerate B, and then exfiltrate B. Both of this plans are contingent on uncertain facts (a) Visualization of the planning procedure. in the environment: in the first case, there is the uncertainty as to whether C is vulnerable to an exploit, and in the second, there is uncertainty regarding the results of dumping credentials on A.
To combat uncertainty and prioritize actions, the planning agents in this section all feature an uncertainty handler and a prioritization procedure, borrowing heavily from our prior work in Applebaum et al. (2016) . Figure 1a visualizes how our planning agents handle uncertainty, described as follows:
1. Evaluate currently available knowledge and identify immediate actions.
2. Extrapolate what may exist in the world using a simulation procedure. 3. Construct a set of plans over the simulated world, evaluating each using the prioritization procedure. 4. Execute the action represented by the most prioritized plan. 5. Observe responses, updating the internal knowledge base and re-running step 1.
To identify the best plan to execute, the attacker scores each plan, selecting the plan with the highest score.
To score each plan, we assign each action an individual action score. Then, for each action in the plan, we sum up the action scores, dividing each action's score by its position in the plan. To mitigate plan length differences, we divide each plan's score by its length. Figure 1b lists example action values along with the scores of each plan; here, the agent would execute dumpCreds(pers1) as per the scores. For each of our planning agents, the cautious configuration prioritizes cautious actions over their normal counterparts (e.g., assigning cautious lateral movement a score of 5 and enumerate a score of 6 in Figure 1b ). Full Planner The full planner follows the same procedure as in Applebaum et al. (2016) . Here, the planner initializes an entirely new world -independent of the real one -combines that world with its current knowledge base to ensure consistency, and then runs an internal gray agent over it a set number of times (e.g., seeding credentials).
Lite Planner The lite planner implements an optimistic and smaller scale simulation of the full planner, yielding a smaller simulated world, using the following rules:
• It guesses with low probability that hosts that have not been exploited are vulnerable.
• For any known host that has not been enumerated, it guesses as to its connections. With low probability, it guesses that unenumerated hosts are connected to unknown hosts.
• It will guess the admins of a host if this information is not known. It always guesses there is at least one known admin as well as one unknown admin.
• Administrator credentials have high probability of being active on a host.
Perfect Knowledge As a baseline, we include a perfect knowledge agent that has access to the complete world state. While it still makes decisions like the other planners, it does not use a real simulation procedure, instead just accessing knowledge in the world directly. This allows it to know, amongst other things, which hosts are vulnerable to exploits and which credentials are active where.
TESTING
We created a total of sixteen different scenarios by providing variations -"high" or "low" -for connectivity, vulnerabilities, gray agent actions, and detection frequency; the specific settings for each are listed in Table 3 . Other settings were held constant for each game, aside from the number of hosts, which ranged from 11 to 21. The number of turns for each game was fixed at the total number of hosts multiplied by two.
For each game, we first initialized the network and then ran the gray agent by itself, recording its actions during each turn. We then reset the network to its initial state, and tested each strategy in turn: during the gray agent's turn, it executes the same actions as it did in the initial sans-attacker run. By running games like this, we are able to compare the attacker strategies to each other with minimal variance. At the end of the game, we record the percentage of all hosts that the adversary established a foothold on, the percentage of all accounts that the adversary obtained credentials for, and the percentage of all hosts that the adversary was able to execute exfiltration from. We ran roughly 50 games for each strategy in each scenario, recording the results for each game. We repeated this process for the cautious version of each strategy as well. Table 4 lists the summary statistics, aggregating over all 16 scenarios, for the percentage of hosts each strategy was able to exfiltrate from, with the values on the left corresponding to the regular configuration, and the values on the right corresponding to the cautious configuration; in Figure 2 we depict this information with a box plot. Tables 5 and 6 go into more detail, reporting the average percentage of Table 5 : Results running the agents over the same game using the regular configuration. Measurements given in the percentage of hosts the attacker established footholds on (F); the percentage of account credentials the attacker obtained (C); and the percentage of hosts the attacker was able to exfiltrate from (E).
RESULTS

Strategies
Conn. Vuln. Acts. Scan. Table 6 : Results running the agents over the same game using the cautious configuration. Measurements given in the percentage of hosts the attacker established footholds on (F); the percentage of account credentials the attacker obtained (C); and the percentage of hosts the attacker was able to exfiltrate from (E).
Conn. Vuln. Acts. Scan. footholds, credentials, and exfiltrations for each strategy in each scenario, with the former reporting for regular and the latter on cautious. Note that our primary point of measurement is the percentage of hosts exfiltrated from; unless stated otherwise, numbers below refer to the percentage of exfiltrations.
The results in Table 5 match our initial intuition: the random agent, on average, performed the worst, while the perfect knowledge agent, on average, performed the best. Of the remaining four, the range in performance was small; the greedy agent performed the worst with only 15.2%, while the lite planner performed the best with 19.3%. The full planner performed slightly worse for exfiltrations than the lite planner, although the lite planner almost doubled the credentials the full planner obtained. The FSM agent performed worse than the full planner, although it obtained the most credentials. The results for each individual scenario roughly followed this pattern. Table 6 shows the results for each of the cautious agents. Comparing these results to that of Table 5 , we see a nearly uniform performance upgrade: all agents, aside from random, perform better than their regular counterparts. This increase was in part expected; the cautious configuration did not impose any additional "cost" on the adversary, although in some cases it may require more turns for the adversary, due to the prerequisite of local host enumeration. As with the regular version, the random agent performs the worst, the perfect knowledge agent performs best, and the lite planner performs second best. However, in this scenario we see a much better performance from the FSM agent -not only does it exfiltrate just about as much as the full planner, it also has three times the number of credentials.The greedy agent did not inherit this advantage, performing worse than all of the others aside from the random agent.
Scenarios Table 7 (left) reports the average exfiltration results for each scenario set as either high or low, ignoring all other scenarios, as well as the difference; Table 7 (right) reports the same, but for the cautious strategies. We can see in Table 7 that scan rate -i.e., the probability the detector would identify the adversary -had the most impact on planner performance; all of the agents performed better when the scan rate was low. A higher vulnerability incidence was most important for the full planner -a 6.2% difference -and while beneficial for the others, not significantly better. Connection frequency -i.e., how often hosts were connected to each other -did not appear to be significantly important. Increased gray agent activity -how often the gray agent would simulate logins, open connections, etc. -helped all agents except for random.
Table 7 (right) shows the average results by scenario where each agent uses a cautious strategy. Gray agent activity now played a much more significant role, with higher activity more important, on average, than lower scan rate. While lowering the scan rate itself was still important, its average difference is less than what was reported for the regular versions. Vulnerabilities, like gray agent activity, were now more important as well. Most interestingly, increased connectivity, which would intuitively lead to higher exfiltration rates, seemed to decrease the performance of each agent. This is likely due to an overabundance of options, as the agents may be overwhelmed with too many targets.
DISCUSSION
The results in Section 5 confirm our initial results in (Applebaum et al. 2016) , showing the viability of our planning-based approach. However, by enhancing our model and adding new agents, we have extended our prior work to show that a) other planning-based strategies (i.e., the lite planner) may outperform and optimize on our initial algorithm, and b) under certain scenarios, a non-planning approach may be just as viable as a planning-based one.
Our work highlights multiple areas for future research and expansion. First, we hope to test additional strategies. In particular, we believe it may be possible to construct a more intelligent FSM through data analysis to determine a better ordering of actions. Additionally, we would like to test the running time of strategies as well. Anecdotally, the planning-engines took much longer than the immediate-execution ones; while the planning engines outperformed the immediate execution ones, there may be time-critical scenarios that necessitate quicker decision making. While our scoring methods did improve over our prior work, we believe that these should be evaluated further; in some cases, the length of the game may have served as a modifier for how well a strategy did.
We also plan to further investigate how attackers can manage risk. While our risk-averse strategies outperformed their risk-unaware counterparts, we believe that this area deserves more formal research. For example, in our model, the attacker must always act, however, in real scenarios an attacker may choose to not execute any action in order to avoid detection. In addition, we hope to expand on the realism of our model by adding in defensive capabilities and expanding on our model; for example, we would like to modify the model to include network shares and host services, and add in dynamic vulnerability status (i.e., patching or adding new vulnerable services).
Conclusion
In this work we have compared adversary emulation strategies and shown how network parameters can influence attackers, yielding interesting results for the broader cyber modeling and simulation community. First, our results illustrate the importance of choosing the right automated adversary emulation strategy: as evidenced by our work, different strategies produce different-strength adversaries, and a defensive technique that is successful against a weaker adversary may not hold up to a more advanced one. Additionally, our results show how network details (i.e., gray agent activity) can interact with the adversary. Understanding both of these points will be useful for defenders using simulations to test their techniques.
